I af custody, and a variety of services and programmes have developed external to the mental hospital. Partly in response to the cost of custodial care, prevention on the one hand and rehabilitation on the other have become important goals.
These new dimensions have now increased in commitment of effort and money to the point where they constitute a major enterprise. They have also become interwoven with existing social welfare programmes.
Thus, social agencies originally intending to serve families with domestic problems, or children in need, or special disadvantaged groups, may now concern themselves with the mental health of their clients from a prophylactic viewpoint, or because mental illness has directly or indirectly affected those with whom they deal. Likewise, educational and recreational programmes relate themselves to mental health, sometimes through deliberate efforts, and more often indirectly, in the belief that their existing activities are relevant. Indeed, the mental hygiene movement that started as an attack on problems directly associated with mental hospitals has become so diffuse and pervasive that it is impossible to draw its boundaries and define its purposes, agencies and activities in any simple way.
In this context of interest, the importance of evaluation is broadly recognized. The meaning given to evaluation, however, is varied; it is sometimes confused, and frequently oversimplified. If A third reason why scientific evaluation both in mental health and in social welfare has been rare arises from some difficulties inherent in the character of programmes in these fields, and these are now discussed. to attribute the differences that may occur between the groups to the treatment procedures rather than to possible selective factors. The effects of selection cannot be handled on a post hoc basis without the very knowledge that evaluation research is intended to yield.
The control group design requires that patients assigned to the experimental group actually receive treatment. If the entire group does not receive treatment, the question arises as to whether those who do were selected on some unknown but relevant basis and hence were more (or less) likely to respond to the treatment. While it is not necessary that every patient receives the treatment, the preponderant group must; otherwise the generalization possible is restricted. Thus, an agency must often take an aggressive approach to its clients. This may seem inconsistent with the viewpoint that clients must voluntarily want services for the treatment to be effective. The only alternative to aggressive attraction of experimental subjects would be denial of services to some of those voluntarily seeking them. This would be even more at variance with other values of the helping professions.
The design of evaluative research may embrace the totality of an agency's activities rather than the specific therapeutic procedures the agency sees itself as practising. In general, practitioners tend to think they have specific skills, and that these produce the results they believe they achieve. When one comes to measure service or treatment in an agency setting, however, the procedures may be so interwoven with administrative, custodial, and other operations that it is impossible to determine whether results are attributable to the treatment procedures or to the complex within which they occur. Hence, agencies may feel that evaluation misses its mark when, in fact, effects result from activities not at all conceived to be a part of treatment efforts. Despite the problems that beset scientific evaluation, there can be no alternative to facing them, and attempting, in the best possible spirit of mutual understanding, to conduct such research. The difficulties should be recognized in order that they can be overcome.
